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ABSTRACT:  
In Gamble v. United States, the defendant questioned the constitutionality of the dual 
sovereignty doctrine under the double jeopardy clause. In its judgment, delivered on 17 
June 2019, the United States Supreme Court upheld the application of the dual 
sovereignty doctrine, according to which different sovereigns may prosecute an 
individual without violating the double jeopardy clause if the individual's act infringed 
the laws of each sovereignty. This comment aims to address the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court and the rationale of the dual sovereignty doctrine, suggesting the 
convenience and necessity of a further study on its limits and possible safeguards 
against potential abuses.  
KEYWORDS: Double jeopardy, multiple prosecutions, dual sovereignty doctrine. 
RESUMEN:  
En Gamble v. United States, el imputado cuestionó la constitucionalidad de la doctrina 
de la soberanía dual, en el contexto de la garantía non bis in ídem. En su sentencia, de 
17 de junio de 2019, la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos confirmó la aplicación de 
 
1 Recibido: 13/08/19. Evaluado: 23/08. Observado y corregido: 30/09. Aceptado: 
3/10/19. 
N. E.: El comentario fue escrito en inglés, idioma de la sentencia, debido a las 
dificultades para traducir con fidelidad algunos términos clave en aquella. 
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la doctrina de la soberanía dual, conforme a la cual distintas soberanías pueden enjuiciar 
a una persona, sin violar el ne bis in idem, si la conducta del imputado infringió las 
leyes de cada una de ellas. El presente comentario tiene por objeto abordar el 
razonamiento de la Corte Suprema y el fundamento de la doctrina de la soberanía dual, 
abogando por la conveniencia y necesidad de un estudio profundizado sobre sus límites 
y posibles salvaguardias en contra de posibles abusos. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: ne bis in idem, persecuciones múltiples, doctrina de la soberanía 
dual. 
 
Summary: Introduction. The case. Reasoning of the Supreme Court. Comment. 1. 
Definition of sovereign for double jeopardy purposes. 2. Is there any safeguard against 






On 17 June 2019, the United States Supreme Court delivered a 7-2 decision in Gamble 
v. United States,2 upholding its long-standing dual sovereignty doctrine under the 
double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
In Gamble v. United States, the defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm, 
contrary to Alabama legislation. After the accused pleaded guilty to this state offence, 
federal prosecutors charged him with the federal version of the same offence, based on 
the same instance of possession. Gamble filled a motion to dismiss, arguing that the 
following federal prosecution was for “the same offence” and thus exposed him to 
double jeopardy. The District Court denied Gamble’s motion to dismiss, decision 
affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit. 
In Gamble, the Supreme Court had to address once again the question whether the 
double jeopardy clause, which prohibits any person from being punished or prosecuted 
for the same offence more than once, bars a federal prosecution after a state prosecution 
for the same offence.  
 
2 Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. (2019), available in: 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-646_d18e.pdf. 
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In its decision, the Supreme Court upheld the dual sovereignty doctrine, concluding that 
the federal government and a state government can bring separate criminal prosecutions 
against the same person for the same conduct. Because each sovereign can define its 
own offences, the Court explained that a single act can qualify as two separate 
“offences”, since a person can violate different sovereigns' laws at the same time.  
Notwithstanding Gamble v. United States was a 7-2 decision, the concurring and 
dissenting opinions could presage eventual discussions about stare decisis. For example, 
although Justice Thomas joined the majority, he wrote a concurring opinion calling on 
the Court to reconsider precedent that it deems inconsistent with the “original 
understanding” of the relevant constitutional or statutory text. Justice Gorsuch, for his 
part, criticised the Court's stare decisis approach, but dissented because he would have 
rejected the dual sovereignty doctrine even under the existing stare decisis framework. 
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate dissent that also noted how the rationale for stare 
decisis is weakest in cases concerning how procedural rules implicate fundamental 
constitutional protections. 
This comment aims to address the rationale and basis of the dual sovereignty doctrine, 
which has been developed and endorsed by the Supreme Court in a case law of 150 
years, and recently upheld in Gamble v. United States. Considering the decision in 
Gamble, it is highly probable that the Supreme Court will not overrule its case law on 







In 2008, Terance Martez Gamble was convicted of second-degree robbery in Alabama.  
In November 2015, a local police officer in Mobile, Alabama, pulled Gamble over for a 
damaged headlight. Smelling marijuana, the officer searched Gamble’s car, where he 
found a firearm. Since Gamble had been convicted of second-degree robbery, his 
possession of the handgun violated an Alabama law providing that no one convicted of 
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“a crime of violence” “shall own a firearm or have one in his or her possession”.3 
Gamble pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one year in prison. 
After Gamble’s conviction, federal prosecutors charged him with the federal version of 
the same offence –one forbidding those convicted of “a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year (…) to ship or transport in interstate or 
foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition”-, 
based on the same instance of possession.4 
Gamble filled a motion to dismiss, arguing that the federal indictment was for “the same 
offence” and thus the federal prosecution was barred by the double jeopardy clause. 
Relying on the dual sovereignty doctrine, the District Court denied defendant’s motion 
to dismiss. Gamble then pleaded guilty to the federal offence while preserving his right 
to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.5  
Gamble appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals, which affirmed the decision based on the dual sovereignty doctrine.6  
The defendant then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, 
which was granted in order to consider “whether the Court should overrule the 'separate 
sovereigns' exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause”.7 
 
 
Reasoning of the Supreme Court 
 
 
1. Justice Alito, writing for the majority, first clarified that, although the dual 
sovereignty rule is often dubbed an “exception” to the double jeopardy clause, it is not 
an exception at all. On the contrary, it flows from the explicit textual reference to an 
“offence”.8  
 
3 Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 2 (2019). 
4 Gamble v. United States, 2.  
5 Gamble v. United States, 2. 
6 Kayla Mullen. “Gamble v. United States: A Commentary”. Duke Journal of 
Constitutional Law & Public Policy, v. 14, n. 1 (2019): pp. 209.  
7 Gamble v. United States, Question Presented, Certiorari Granted on 28 June, 2018.  
8 Gamble v. United States, 3. 
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2. The Court focused on the meaning of the word “offence”, which was originally 
understood as the transgression or violation of a law.9 Offences are defined by a law, 
and each law is defined by a sovereign.10 In this regard, the Court cited Moore v. The 
People of the State of Illinois, which underlined that “the constitutional provision is not 
that no person shall be subject, for the same act, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; but for the same offence, the same violation of law, no person’s life or limb shall 
be twice put in jeopardy”.11 The Court affirmed that there is no reason to abandon this 
sovereign-specific reading of the phrase “same offence”, from which the dual 
sovereignty rule follows.12 Thus, even if federal and state prosecutions are based on the 
same conduct, the offences are not the same, because one offence violates state law and 
the other offence violates Federal law. 
3. The Court emphasised that its reading of the double jeopardy clause is consistent with 
its case law and respects the possibility that two sovereigns could have different 
interests “in punishing the same act”. The question of successive federal and state 
prosecutions was addressed by the Court in three antebellum cases.13 In Fox v. Ohio, the 
Supreme Court affirmed that the nature of the crime or its effects on public safety might 
well demand separate prosecutions.14 In United States v. Marigold, the Court 
generalised the previous idea and declared that “the same act might, as to its character 
and tendencies, and the consequences it involved, constitute an offence against both the 
State and Federal governments, and might draw to its commission the penalties 
denounced by either, as appropriate to its character in reference to each”.15 The third 
antebellum case was Moore v. Illinois. In this case, the Court highlighted that the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits double jeopardy not “for the same act” but “for the same 
 
9 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892); Kokesh v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 581 U.S., 5 (2017).  
10 Gamble v. United States, 3-4. 
11 Gamble v. United States, 4; Moore v. The People of the State of Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 
How.) 13, 17 (1852).  
12 Gamble v. United States, 5. 
13 Gamble v. United States, 6-7. 
14 Fox v. The State of Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 435 (1847). 
15 United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560, 569 (1850). 
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offence”.16 Since “an offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a 
law”,17 the Court concluded that a single act may be an offence or transgression of the 
laws of two sovereigns, and hence punishable by both.18 The underlying idea to these 
three cases was straightforward: a crime against two sovereigns constitutes two 
offences. 
The Supreme Court cemented this idea 70 years after, in United States v. Lanza. The 
Court upheld a federal prosecution that followed a state prosecution, ruling that “an act 
denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offence against the 
peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each”.19 The precedent in Lanza was 
subsequently applied in several cases, such as Screws v. United States,20 Jerome v. 
United States,21 Westfall v. United States,22 and Hebert v. Louisiana, among others.23 In 
1959, the Supreme Court reaffirmed once again its doctrine, in Bartkus v. Illinois and 
Abbate v. United States, finding no consideration or persuasive reason to overruled 
Lanza.24 After these two cases, the Court has applied the dual sovereignty doctrine 
during six decades of cases.25  
4. The Supreme Court utilised, among others, probably the more provocative example 
of a prosecution in the United States for a crime committed abroad. In this regard, the 
Court pointed out that if, as the defendant argued, “only one sovereign may prosecute 
for a single act, no American court -state or federal- could prosecute conduct already 
tried in a foreign court”.26 For example, if a U. S. national is murdered abroad, the other 
 
16 Moore v. The People of the State of Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 17 (1852). 
17 Moore v. The People of the State of Illinois, 19. 
18 Moore v. The People of the State of Illinois, 20. 
19 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). 
20 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (note 10) (1945). 
21 Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 105 (1943). 
22 Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 258 (1927). 
23 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 31, 314 (1926). 
24 Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187, 195 (1959). Similarly, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 
U.S. 121 (1959). 
25 See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U. S. 82 (1985), United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313 
(1978), and Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U. S. 22 (1977), among others.  
26 Gamble v. United States, 7. 
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country will rightfully seek to punish the killer. The foreign country’s interest lies in 
protecting the peace in its territory rather than protecting the American specifically. 
However, the United States looks at the same conduct and sees an act of violence 
against one of its nationals. The murder of a U. S. national is an offence to the United 
States as much as it is to the country where the murder occurred and to which the victim 
is a stranger. That is why, explained the Court, the killing of an American abroad is a 
federal offence that can be prosecuted in the American courts.27  
5. The Court addressed the counter argument that it is an error treating the federal and 
state governments as two separate sovereigns because sovereignty belongs to the 
people. The concept of sovereignty would be unitary, not dual. The Court replied that 
that argument is based on a non sequitur.28 It is true that the Constitution rests on the 
principle that the people are sovereign, but that does not mean that the people conferred 
all the attributes of sovereignty on a single government. Instead, the people, by adopting 
the Constitution, “split the atom of sovereignty”.29  
6. Gamble also argued that the recognition of the double jeopardy Clause’s 
incorporation against the states in Benton v. Maryland30 washed away any theoretical 
foundation for the dual sovereignty doctrine.31 The Supreme Court rejected his 
argument, stating that the premises of the dual sovereignty doctrine have survived 
incorporation intact. “Incorporation meant that the States were now required to abide by 
this Court’s interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. But that interpretation has 
long included the dual sovereignty doctrine, and there is no logical reason why 
incorporation should change it”.32  
After all, the dual sovereignty doctrine rests on the fact that only same sovereign 
successive prosecutions are prosecutions for the “same offence”, and that is just as true 
after incorporation as before.33 
 
 
27 Gamble v. United States, 7. 
28 Gamble v. United States, 8-9. 
29 Gamble v. United States, 9. 
30 Benton v. Maryland 395 U. S. 784, 794 (1969). 
31 Gamble v. United States, 29.  
32 Gamble v. United States, 30. 
33 Gamble v. United States, 30. 
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The Fifth Amendment provision against double jeopardy is one of the basic protections 
afforded defendants by the United States Constitution.34 The Fifth Amendment reads in 
part: “Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb”. 
The United States Constitution was the first major constitutional instrument in 
recognising the protection against double jeopardy, and was largely inspired by the 
operation in English law of what are referred to as pleas in bar.35 Even though the 
precise origins of the protection are unclear,36 there is no doubt that the double jeopardy 
possesses a long history.37 As Justice Black correctly affirmed, the protection against 
 
34 Jay Sigler. “Federal Double Jeopardy Policy”, Vanderbilt Law Review, v. 19, n 2 
(1966): 375. 
35 Andrea Koklys. “Second Chance for Justice: Reevaluation of the United States 
Double Jeopardy Standard”, John Marshall Law Review, v. 40, n. 1 (2006): 379; Brian 
Summers. “Double Jeopardy: Rethinking the Parameters of the Multiplicity 
Prohibition”, Ohio State Law Journal, v. 56, n. 5 (1995): 1595. 
36 For example, David Rudstein and Jay Sigler state that the Code of Hammurabi made 
no reference to double jeopardy clause. Jay Sigler. “A History of Double Jeopardy”, 
American Journal of Legal History, v. 7, n. 4 (1963): 284 (note 6); David Rudstein. “A 
Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy”, William & 
Mary Bill of Rights Journal, v. 14, n. 1 (2005): 196. Instead, Thomas III affirms that 
“laws against changing a final judgment can be traced to the Code of Hammurabi”. 
George Thomas III. Double Jeopardy. The History, the Law (New York: New York 
University Press, 1998), 1. Similarly, Darius Patraus. “The non bis in idem principle in 
the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union -consistency or 
inconsistency?”, AGORA International Journal of Juridical Sciences, n. 1 (2018): 26. 
37 Rudstein. “A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double 
Jeopardy”, 196.  
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being tried twice for the same offence is one of the oldest ideas found in western 
civilization, which roots run deep into Greek and Roman times.38 
According to the Supreme Court case law, the double jeopardy clause provides three 
basic related protections: “It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense”.39  
Nevertheless, under the dual sovereignty doctrine40 different sovereigns may prosecute 
an individual without violating the double jeopardy clause if the individual's act 
infringed the laws of each sovereignty.41  
As the Supreme Court underlined in Gamble v. United States, the essence of the dual 
sovereignty doctrine is the common law conception of crime as an offence against the 
sovereignty of the government.42 When a defendant in a single act violates the “peace 
and dignity” of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he committees two distinct 
offences.43  
 
38 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-152 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).  
39 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); United States v. Wilson, 420 
U.S. 332, 343 (1975); Rudstein. “A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee 
Against Double Jeopardy”, 193-194; Adam Adler. “Dual Sovereignty, Due Process, and 
Duplicative Punishment: A New Solution to an Old Problem”, Yale Law Journal, v. 
124, n. 2 (2014): 450.  
40 For a general explanation, see David Rudstein. Double Jeopardy. A Reference Guide 
to the United States Constitution (Westport: Praeger, 2004), 84-92.  
41 Adler. “Dual Sovereignty, Due Process, and Duplicative Punishment: A New 
Solution to an Old Problem”, 450. 
42 Heath v. Alabama, 88; Akhil Reed and Jonathan Marcus. “Double Jeopardy Law 
After Rodney King”, Columbia Law Review, v. 95, n. 1 (1995): 5; James King. “The 
Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State Prosecutions: A Fifth 
Amendment Solution”, Stanford Law Review, v. 31, n. 3 (1979): 484; Jay Brickman. 
“The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine and Successive State Prosecutions: Health v. 
Alabama”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, v. 63, n. 1 (1987): 176. 
43 United States v. Lanza, 382; Ray Stoner. “Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty: A 
Critical Analysis”, William & Mary Law Review, v. 11, n. 4 (1970): 946; Adler. “Dual 
Javier Escobar Veas, Double Jeopardy and dual Sovereignty Doctrine: Gamble v. United States. Revista de Derecho Nº 20 (dic. 2019): 225-244 
 
Revista de Derecho (UCUDAL). 2da época. Año 15. N° 20 (dic. 2019). ISSN 1510-3714. ISSN on line 2393-6193                                 234 
 
The dual sovereignty doctrine was firstly recognized to protect principles of 
federalism.44 As correctly indicated, “behind the dual sovereign debate is a conflict 
between two ancient legal principles: sovereignty and double jeopardy”.45 The Supreme 
Court was concerned that an expansive reading of the double jeopardy clause would bar 
either the federal government or individual state governments from enforcing their 
respective criminal laws.46 Binding the federal or state prosecution to the first 
adjudication would result in a “race of offenders”. Defendants will plead guilty in the 
jurisdiction with the lesser fines or punishments, securing immunity from the harsher 
law.47 As previously said, in Moore v. Illinois the Supreme Court affirmed that “every 
citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a state or territory. He may be said to owe 
allegiance to two sovereigns and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the 
laws of either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both”. 
 
Sovereignty, Due Process, and Duplicative Punishment: A New Solution to an Old 
Problem”, 450. 
44 Erin Cranman. “The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Champion 
of Justice or a Violation of a Fundamental Right”, Emory International Law Review, v. 
14, n. 3 (2000): 1654; Walter Fisher. “Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the 
Intruding Constitution”, The University of Chicago Law Review, v. 28, n. 4 (1961): 599. 
45 David Owsley. “Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A 
Hard Case Study”, Washington University Law Review, v. 81, n. 3 (2003): 797.  
46 Daniel Principato. “Defining the Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the Protection 
against Double Jeopardy Bar Successive Prosecutions in National and International 
Courts”, Cornell International Law Journal, v. 47, n. 3 (2014): 773; Cranman. “The 
Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Champion of Justice or a Violation 
of a Fundamental Right”, 1654. King has pointed out that “this rule is based on an 
abstract theory -that of "dual sovereignty"- and a practical concern -that a contrary rule 
would allow one government to effectively nullify the other government's law”. King. 
“The Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State Prosecutions: A Fifth 
Amendment Solution”, 477. 
47 United States v. Lanza, 385. A similar argument can be found in Heath v. Alabama, 
93. 
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Therefore, “that either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, cannot be 
doubted”.48  
In Heath v. Alabama,49 the Supreme Court addressed the question whether the dual 
sovereignty doctrine permitted successive prosecutions under the laws of different states 
which otherwise would be held to subject the defendant for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy.50 The Court concluded that the dual sovereignty doctrine, as originally 
articulated and consistently applied, compels the conclusion that successive 
prosecutions by two states for the same conduct are not barred by the double jeopardy 
clause,51 because “the states are no less sovereign with respect to each other than they 
are with respect to the Federal Government”.52 The interest of a state in vindicating its 
sovereign authority through enforcement of its laws by definition can never be satisfied 
by the enforcement of another state of its own laws.53  
The Supreme Court exemplified the foregoing reasoning with the case of a prosecution 
in the United States for a crime committed abroad. Since two sovereigns can have 
different interests in punishing the same conduct, it would be a mistake to prohibit one 
of them from prosecuting the defendant just because the other did it first, especially if it 
is considered that none of them can prevent the prosecution of the other one. 
International law instruments have adopted the same approach. Indeed, at international 
level the protection against double jeopardy is limited to multiple prosecutions or 
punishments within a single state,54 accepting therefore subsequent prosecutions in 
 
48 Moore v. The People of the State of Illinois, 20. 
49 For a positive comment, see Brickman. “The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine and 
Successive State Prosecutions: Health v. Alabama”, 183-188.  
50 Heath v. Alabama, 88 
51 Heath v. Alabama, 88; Cranman. “The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double 
Jeopardy: A Champion of Justice or a Violation of a Fundamental Right”, 1655. 
52 Heath v. Alabama, 89. 
53 Heath v. Alabama, 93. For a critical comment on the Court’s arguments in Heath v. 
Alabama, see Ronald Allen and John Ratnaswamy. “Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study 
of Doctrine and Rationality in the Supreme Court”, Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, v. 76, n. 4 (1985): 814-824.  
54 Anthony Colangelo. “Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional 
Theory”, Washington University Law Review, v. 86, n. 4 (2009): 779. 
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different states. This lack of an international protection against double jeopardy has 
been explained affirming that under a jurisdictional theory “each state as an independent 
lawgiver may exercise its national jurisdiction to apply and enforce its own laws”. 55 
In conclusion, the dual sovereignty doctrine denies double jeopardy protection in three 
circumstances: (1) successive prosecutions of an individual by multiple state 
governments; (2) successive prosecutions of an individual by a state and the federal 
government; and (3) successive prosecutions of an individual by a state or the federal 
government and a foreign government.56 By contrast, successive prosecutions for the 
same offence by the same sovereign are prohibited by the protection against double 
jeopardy.57 The dual sovereignty doctrine can be understood therefore to allow both 
horizontal prosecutions between states and vertical prosecutions between a state and the 
federal government.58  
 
 
1. Definition of sovereign for double jeopardy purposes 
 
 
Since the protection against double jeopardy only bars successive prosecutions by the 
same sovereign, it is crucial to define the term “sovereign”.59 The Supreme Court has 
 
55 Colangelo. “Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional Theory”, 
779. 
56 Cranman. “The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Champion of 
Justice or a Violation of a Fundamental Right”, 1644; Principato. “Defining the 
Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the Protection against Double Jeopardy Bar 
Successive Prosecutions in National and International Courts”, 773.  
57 Principato. “Defining the Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the Protection against 
Double Jeopardy Bar Successive Prosecutions in National and International Courts”, 
774. 
58 Principato. “Defining the Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the Protection against 
Double Jeopardy Bar Successive Prosecutions in National and International Courts”, 
773.  
59 Colangelo. “Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional Theory”, 
779.  
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stated that the question of whether two entities are separate sovereigns “turns on 
whether the two entities draw their authority to punish the offender from distinct 
sources of power”.60 Thus, for double jeopardy purposes the sovereignty of two 
prosecuting entities is determined by the ultimate source of the power under which the 
respective prosecutions were taken.61 If two entities have the same ultimate source of 
power, hence they both should be considered as one sovereign.62 With regard to the 
meaning of “last source of power”, the Supreme Court explained in Heath v. Alabama 
that two entities are separate sovereigns when “each has the power, inherent in any 
sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an offense against its authority and 
to punish such offenses, and in doing so each is exercising its own sovereignty, not that 
of the other”.63  
In applying the previous definition of sovereignty, the Supreme Court has ruled that, for 
double jeopardy purposes, a state and its municipalities are the same sovereign.64 
Therefore, a state and its municipality are barred from prosecuting an individual for the 
same offence, not being applicable the double sovereignty doctrine.65 In holding this, 
the Supreme Court has emphasized that “political subdivisions of states— counties, 
cities or whatever— never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities. 
Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate government 
instrumentalities created by the state to assist in the carrying out of state governmental 
functions”.66 Similarly, the federal government and its territories have been considered 
 
60 Heath v. Alabama, 88; William McAninch. “Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy”, 
South Carolina Law Review, v. 44, n. 3 (1993): 425. 
61 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (2004); Heath v. Alabama, 90; United States 
v. Wheeler, 320. 
62 Principato. “Defining the Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the Protection against 
Double Jeopardy Bar Successive Prosecutions in National and International Courts”, 
774. 
63 Heath v. Alabama, 89. 
64 Waller v. Florida, 394-395. 
65 Waller v. Florida, 394-395. 
66 Waller v. Florida, 392; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964). 
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the same sovereign for double jeopardy purposes.67 In deciding that the Philippines and 
the federal government were the same sovereign, the Court observed that “the 
government of a state does not derive its powers from the United States, while the 
government of the Philippines owes its existence wholly to the United States, and its 
judicial tribunals exert all their powers by the authority of the United States”.68  
These cases make clear that, if an entity derives its sovereignty from another entity, then 
according to the Supreme Court those entities should be considered the same sovereign 
for double jeopardy purposes.69 
 
 




Since its recognition, the dual sovereignty doctrine has been highly criticised.70 
According to its critics, it offends individual’s interest in finality and exposes 
defendants to capricious prosecutorial discretion.71 Another problem with the dual 
 
67 United States v. Wheeler, 318; Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 262-264 
(1937); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354 (1907); Principato. “Defining the 
Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the Protection against Double Jeopardy Bar 
Successive Prosecutions in National and International Courts”, 775. 
68 Grafton v. United States, 354. 
69 Principato. “Defining the Sovereign in Dual Sovereignty: Does the Protection against 
Double Jeopardy Bar Successive Prosecutions in National and International Courts”, 
775. 
70 Michael Dawson directly affirms that the dual sovereignty doctrine is 
unconstitutional. Michael Dawson. “Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the 
Dual Sovereignty Doctrine”, Yale Law Journal, v. 102, n. 1 (1992): 299-302. 
71 Cranman. “The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Champion of 
Justice or a Violation of a Fundamental Right”, 1667. Suggesting a serious 
reexamination of the dual sovereignty doctrine after Benton v. Maryland, Richard 
Boyle. “Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty: The Impact of Benton v. Maryland on 
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sovereignty doctrine would be that it is almost limitless, existing an extreme potential 
for abuse.72  
Although the double jeopardy clause does not bar a federal prosecution following a state 
prosecution for the same conduct, in response to the Bartkus decision the Department of 
Justice instituted the Petite Policy,73 which places limits on the federal government’s 
prosecutorial discretion, thereby assuaging fears of arbitrary successive prosecutions.74 
The Petite Policy establishes guidelines for the exercise of discretion by the Department 
of Justice in determining whether to bring a federal prosecution based on substantially 
the same acts involved in a prior state or federal proceeding.75 The Petite Policy 
“precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution, following a prior state 
or federal prosecution based on substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s) unless 
three substantive prerequisites are satisfied”: first, the matter must involve a substantial 
federal interest; second, the prior prosecution must have left that interest demonstrably 
unvindicated; and third, the defendant's conduct must constitutes a federal offence and 
the admissible evidence should be probably sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction. 
In addition, the prosecution must be approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney 
 
Successive Prosecution for the Same Offense by State and Federal Governments”, 
Indiana Law Journal, v. 46, n. 3 (1971): 422-427. Similarly, Mullen. “Gamble v. United 
States: A Commentary”, 218; Stoner. “Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty: A 
Critical Analysis”, 952-954.  
72 Cranman. “The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Champion of 
Justice or a Violation of a Fundamental Right”, 1669. 
73 The Petite Policy derives its name from Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). 
Rudstein, Double Jeopardy…, 87; Dawson. “Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, 
and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine”, 293.  
74 Owsley. “Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Hard 
Case Study”, 793; Ellen Podgor. “Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing 
Discretionary Justice”, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, v. 13, n. 2 (2004): 
177-181.  
75 Justice Manual, Title 9: Criminal, Section 9-2.031 – Dual and Successive Prosecution 
Policy. 
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General.76 In determining whether a second prosecution may be authorized, it has been 
noted that the second criterion is critical.77 Satisfaction of these requisites does not 
mean however that a proposed prosecution must be approved or brought, since 
traditional elements of federal prosecutorial discretion continue to apply.78 
Even though the government has discretion to dismiss cases when its Petite policy is 
violated,79 defendants are not afforded this same opportunity. Because courts have 
found that the Petite Policy is a mere government policy, rather than a matter of 
constitutional law,80 defendants “may not seek dismissal of a federal prosecution on the 
ground that the government brought the prosecution in violation of the policy”.81  
As can be imagine, unfortunately there are no records concerning the discussion and the 
decision of the Department of Justice on the application of the Petit Policy to the 
specific case of Gamble. However, at least at first sight it would seem debatable the 
satisfaction of the first and the second requirements of the Policy. Indeed, the defendant 
had already been convicted to one year in prison for a crime that was neither a violent 
nor a serious offence. Did the matter involve a substantial federal interest? Had the state 
prosecution left a federal interest without vindicating? The case of Gamble could be a 
good example to illustrate the shortcomings of the Petit Policy.  
In addition to the Petite Policy, David Owsley has stated that potential abuses of the 
dual sovereignty doctrine are checked by the political accountability of the executive 
 
76 Justice Manual, Title 9: Criminal, Section 9-2.031 – Dual and Successive Prosecution 
Policy; Podgor. “Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing Discretionary Justice”, 
178; John Cooney. “Multi-Jurisdictional and Successive Prosecution of Environmental 
Crimes: The Case for a Consistent Approach”, Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, v. 96, n. 2 (2006): 448.  
77 Cooney. “Multi-Jurisdictional and Successive Prosecution of Environmental Crimes: 
The Case for a Consistent Approach”, 448. 
78 Justice Manual, Title 9: Criminal, Section 9-2.031 – Dual and Successive Prosecution 
Policy. 
79 For instance, Thompson v. United States, 444 U.S. 248 (1980); Marakar v. United 
States, 370 U. S. 723 (1962); Petite v. United States, 361 U. S. 529 (1960). 
80 Podgor. “Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing Discretionary Justice”, 179-
180. 
81 Rudstein, Double Jeopardy…, 87. 
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branch; state legislation; federal sentencing guidelines that can prevent duplicative 
punishment or mitigate the unfairness of a successive prosecution; and continuing 
vigilance of state and national electorates who can consent at any time through 
legislation, generally or particularly tailored, to the adjudications of other 
jurisdictions.82 
Although it can be certainly argued that these safeguards are not very robust, especially 
the political accountability of the executive branch and the continuing vigilance of state 
and national electorates, the merit of Owsley is having put the focus on other kind of 
safeguards, different to the double jeopardy clause. Indeed, as Adam Adler has pointed 
out, the problem with most of the criticisms against the dual sovereignty doctrine is that 
they focus too much on the double jeopardy clause and the dual sovereignty doctrine 
itself, excluding other legal or constitutional provisions.83 
It is important to highlight that the same Supreme Court has recognised that some of the 
ills at which some interpretations on double jeopardy have been directed are addressed 
by other constitutional provisions.84 
Some additional protections against potential abuses of the dual sovereignty doctrine 
that could be developed are the due process clause;85 the prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishments and the excessive fines clause, both established in the Eighth 
Amendment,86 and the collateral estoppel.87 The study of all these guarantees and 
protections is indubitably beyond the possibilities of this comment. Nevertheless, 
 
82 Owsley. “Accepting the Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Hard 
Case Study”, 795-796. 
83 For example, King. “The Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State 
Prosecutions: A Fifth Amendment Solution”, 478, has suggested a “fifth amendment 
standard that solves the "over breadth" problem inherent in the Bartkus-Abbate rule”.  
84 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102-103 (1997). 
85 Adler. “Dual Sovereignty, Due Process, and Duplicative Punishment: A New 
Solution to an Old Problem”, 451.  
86 Nancy King. “Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and 
Excessive Penalties”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, v. 144, n. 1 (1995): 150. 
87 Nina Shreve. “Expanded Application of Collateral Estoppel Defense in Criminal 
Prosecutions (United States ex rel. Rogers v. LaVallee)”, John's Law Review, v. 50, n. 2 
(2012): 339-347.  
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considering that it is quite probable that the Supreme Court will not overrule the dual 
sovereignty doctrine, at least not in the near future, their further study is highly 
recommended.  
 
Contribución: 100% del autor. 
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